题 目：Multiple Directorships and Audit Committee Effectiveness: Evidence from Effort Allocation
报告人：郑 祯 助理教授
论文摘要：Recent post-SOX studies have consistently found that the presence of audit committee (AC) directors with multiple directorships is associated with lower financial reporting quality. One major problem with these studies is that they implicitly assume that AC directors distribute their effort equally across all directorships. Using firm size (which proxies for reputation incentives) and risk of litigation and misstatements (which proxy for risk incentives) as measures of relative directorship importance, we investigate (1) how AC directors serving in multiple directorships allocate their effort to different directorships, and (2) whether the unequal prioritization of effort across multiple directorships affects AC monitoring effectiveness. We find a positive (no) association between the risk-based (firm-size-based) directorship importance measure and AC effectiveness, suggesting that AC directors serving on multiple boards unequally allocate their effort to different directorships and risk incentives appear to outweigh reputation incentives in their effort allocation. Our results are robust to controlling for endogeneity.